Maximum severity unauthenticated RCE in self-managed GitLab (CVE-2026-110264)
GitLab Community Edition and Enterprise Edition, when self-managed, contain a maximum severity integer overflow in the regular expression compiler (CVE-2026-110264, CVSS 10.0). GitLab says that, under certain conditions, the flaw could have allowed an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the GitLab server through a specially crafted regular expression. Every self-managed release from 7.0 up to the October 21, 2026 fixes is affected.
GitLab’s detection guidance places the trigger in the Org-mode file renderer, where a keyword on a #+TODO: line in a .org file feeds a regular expression. The attack needs no login, only a public project that can hold the crafted file. Successful exploitation runs code as the git user, which exposes instance secrets, CI/CD variables, runner and access tokens, and read and write access to every repository on the instance. GitLab.com and GitLab Dedicated are patched and need no action. No public proof of concept and no exploitation in the wild had been reported as of October 22, 2026, and GitLab offers no workaround.
An instance updated for GitLab’s October 12, 2026 release is not covered: the October 12 fixes (19.4.2, 19.3.5, 19.2.8) sit one patch below the fixed versions for their branches. Instances on a release line older than 18.11 have no direct fix and must upgrade through GitLab’s required upgrade stops to a supported release.
What to do
- Upgrade every self-managed GitLab instance to the fixed version for its branch: 19.5.1, 19.4.3, 19.3.6, 19.2.9, 19.1.9, 19.0.10, or 18.11.13, starting with internet-facing instances.
- On a release line older than 18.11, follow GitLab’s upgrade path to a supported release instead of waiting for a backport that does not exist for that line.
- After upgrading, check for signs of code execution that GitLab lists, including unexpected child processes of Puma, new files owned by git in /tmp, and changed crontabs or SSH keys for the git user. Where those signs appear, treat the instance as compromised and rotate its secrets.
A code host holds the keys to everything built on it, so a flaw in it is a flaw in the whole delivery chain. ZeroBreach’s server-layer audits inventory self-managed software alongside websites, and its recurring scans flag known-exploited versions before a forgotten server becomes the entry point.