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Malicious LiteLLM 1.107.0 release stole credentials from PyPI and Docker installs

Tags: python, litellm, malware, exploited

On October 21, 2026, attackers pushed a malicious LiteLLM 1.107.0 release through LiteLLM’s own release pipeline to PyPI and to Docker Hub and GHCR. All seven PyPI wheels carried the payload, and the Docker tags v1.107.0, latest, main-latest, and main-stable served the compromised image during the exposure window. LiteLLM’s official incident post states that the malware steals credentials and loads remote code execution tools.

The payload runs at Python interpreter startup through files placed in site-packages (cook.pth, cook.py, and sitecustomize.py), so it can run even when an application never imports LiteLLM, and removing the LiteLLM package alone does not remove it. LiteLLM’s post states that the PyPI release was live from 11:39 UTC to 13:23 UTC on October 21, 2026, and that the Docker tags were affected from 11:46 UTC to 14:20 UTC. The official v1.107.0 source tag does not contain the malicious files, because the artifacts were built from an attacker controlled lookalike repository. Enterprise customers pulling from LiteLLM’s private registry were not affected.

Any host that installed litellm 1.107.0, or that ran one of the affected Docker tags in the exposure window, must be treated as compromised. LiteLLM’s incident post directs affected users to pin 1.106.2, which is the last clean release named in the post, and to rotate every secret the host could reach, including LiteLLM proxy database keys, master and virtual keys, database passwords, cloud credentials, and provider keys.

What to do

  • Check every host, CI runner, and container image for litellm 1.107.0, for the affected Docker tags or image digest, and for cook.pth, cook.py, and sitecustomize.py in site-packages.
  • On an affected host, delete the payload files and kill the detached Python process before running Python again, then rebuild the environment from scratch pinned to litellm 1.106.2.
  • Rotate every credential the host could reach, including cloud roles, provider keys, LiteLLM proxy keys, database passwords, SSH keys, and secrets in process environments, and check cloud audit logs for use of those credentials from outside the infrastructure.
  • Pin LiteLLM by version and by image digest in future deployments, and never let a production deployment track a floating tag such as latest.

A poisoned release in a dependency is the kind of failure that hides in a lockfile until it is too late. ZeroBreach’s recurring scans inventory every package and image on your server and flag versions that must not run.